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Ronald Dworkin has been the phenomenon of our age. He has
dominated jurisprudential discussion over the past twenty years even
more completely than John Rawls has dominated discussion of ethics
since the publication ofA Theory of Justice' in 1971. It has often seemed
that, if an author was not prepared to focus primarily on Dworkin's
work, he was not doing jurisprudence. Whether this domination of a
field by one person is a healthy phenomenon is another question. The
importance of Dworkin's latest work, Law's Empire,2 however, lies not
only in the fact that it will undoubtedly continue Dworkin's domination
of jurisprudential discourse, but also in the fact that it is his first real
book. His enormously successful Taking Rights Seriously3 was a collec-
tion of previously published essays, as was most of his second book, A
Matter ofPinciple.4 Law's Empire, by contrast, was written to be read as
a coherent whole.
Dworkin began his domination of contemporary jurisprudence by
attacking H.L.A. Hart's concession that, at its penumbras, law was un-
certain.5 It was the task of the judge to resolve this uncertainty as best he
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could, given the legal sources available to him. In the performance of
this task, according to Hart, the exercise of some degree of judicial dis-
cretion was inevitable. Dworkin set out to show that, even in cases
where the conventional sources of law (namely the statutes and the previ-
ously decided cases) did not seem to provide a clear answer, the courts
were not called upon to exercise the significant degree of discretion that
Hart supposed.
Dworkin initially asserted that, when existing rules of law did not
cover a case or when the existing rules of law were in conflict, resort
could be had to the "principles" embedded, so to speak, in the legal sys-
tem to ascertain the right decision of the case.6 He recognized that a
number of principles could point in competing directions and might even
directly conflict. 7 A means for weighting principles was thus required.
Neither Dworkin nor anyone else has yet produced that weighted list of
principles, however. Taking a slightly different tack, Dworkin then as-
serted that, in difficult cases (the so-called hard cases), it is the task of the
judge "to find a coherent set of principles" that will justify his decision.
These guiding principles are to be selected "in the way that fairness re-
quires" in light of the "institutional history" of a society's legal struc-
ture.8 Pursuing this suggestion further, Dworkin next claimed that in
nearly all cases, at least in advanced and complex societies with long
legal traditions such as the United States or Great Britain, one set of
principles, and the decision they justify, would provide a better fit with
that society's basic legal structure than would a competing set of princi-
ples pointing to a different or even contrary decision.9 Dworkin did not,
however, support this assertion; he assumed that it was obviously true.
He came to assume that there was some notion of "normative consis-
tency" that could be relied on to support his position.' 0 Furthermore,
when one of those rare cases arises in which no one set of principles is
accepted as dispositive by most of the participants in the legal enterprise,
Dworkin thought that recourse should be had to what he called "moral
facts.""1 These moral facts in some way proceed from political theory
and ultimately produce moral rights. Thus, in hard cases, when conven-
tional legal theory cannot produce the right answer, the right answer
may still be found by asking what moral rights are at stake. Dworkin
6. See R. DWORIN, supra note 3, at 22-3 1.
7. See id. at 22-31, 35-36.
8. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1098-99 (1972), reprinted in 1. DWORKIN,
supra note 3, at 81, 120-21.
9. See Dworkin, No Right Answer?, 53 N.Y.U. L. Pv. 1, 30 (1978), reprinted in R. DwoR-
xiN, supra note 4, at 119, 143.
10. Id. at 28-29.
11. I . at 30-32.
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claimed that it would be an "extremely rare" case, if any such case "ex-
ist[s] at all," for which there would be "no right answer."12
In trying to meet the objections of his critics, Dworkin thus came to
assume that there are almost always "right answers" to the moral ques-
tions confronting a society. Otherwise, under Dworkin's theory, there
could not almost always be right answers to legal questions. Seeking to
support this thesis, Dworkin broadened the scope of his intellectual inter-
ests. He became interested in interpretation and the similarity he de-
tected between the task of the literary critic trying to come up with the
best interpretation of a literary text and the task of the judge trying to
come up with the best decision in the light of his society's legal tradi-
tions-traditions informed ultimately by the basic morality underpinning
that society. 13 In the course of expanding his intellectual focus, Dworkin
openly came to acknowledge that legal decisions are a species of political
decision not merely because they necessarily involve the application of
power by state organs, but also because they are and must be motivated
by basic political theory.14 While some might think that law and politics
are diametrically opposed, Dworkin seemed driven to equate them. For
him, politics is ultimately premised on morality, and, as we have seen, it
is only through resort to morality that the legal system attains the closure
that permits us to claim that there are indeed right answers to (almost)
all legal questions. In Law's Empire, Dworkin sets out to present a co-
herent restatement of his position as it has thus evolved. In the course of
doing so, he has added some significant nuances that make his theories
somewhat less controversial, and unfortunately, less original and inter-
esting. Although well written, Law's Empire is a long and complex
book. Accordingly, I will set out Dworkin's argument as accurately as I
am able and reserve most of my critical remarks, some of which I am
afraid will be quite critical indeed, for the final pages of this review.
12. Id at 31-32.
13. See generally Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 527 (1982), reprinted in R.
DWORKJN, supra note 4, at 146; Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels):
Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Anymore, in THE PoLrrics OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W.
Mitchell ed. 1983), reprinted in modiled form in R. DwoucN, supra note 4, at 167; Dworkin, Law's
Ambitions for Itse, 71 VA. L. REv. 173 (1985).
14. Dworkin wrote in A Matter of Prindple.
I shall argue that legal practice is an exercise in interpretation not only when lawyers
interpret particular documents or statutes but generally. Law so conceived is deeply and
thoroughly political. Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense ofpolit-
ical theory. But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics, and a critique of law
that does not understand this diffierence will provide poor understanding and even poorer
guidance.
R. DwoRxiN, supra note 4, at 146. These are the opening lines of Dworkin, Law as Interpretaton,
supra note 13.
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I.
Dworkin begins Law's Empire by distinguishing between two differ-
ent kinds of disputes that might arise when people cannot agree on "what
is the pertinent law." 15 In the first kind of dispute, people might disagree
over whether there are any statutes or precedents on point. Dworkin
calls this "empirical disagreement about law." 16 Presumably such dis-
putes can be resolved by it more thorough examination of the statute
books and the law reports. These are not the kinds of disputes with
which Dworkin is interested. Rather, he is interested in what he calls
"theoretical disagreement." 17 Theoretical disagreement arises when peo-
ple "disagree about the grounds of law, about which other kinds of pro-
positions, when true, make a particular proposition of law true""1-that
is, when "they disagree about whether statute books and judicial deci-
sions exhaust the pertinent grounds of law." 19 In examining the nature
of theoretical disagreement about law, Dworkin adopts the internal point
of view of the participants in the legal process, and more specifically the
point of view of the judge, not the external point of view of a sociologist
or historian.20 Dworkin sets out to attack what he describes as the cen-
tral thesis of positivism: that "genuine disagreement about what the law
is must be an empirical disagreement about the history of legal institu-
tions," 21 and that, if a thorough examination of that history cannot re-
solve the disagreement, then disagreement over what the law is is
"disguised argument about what the law should be."22
In developing his argument against positivism, Dworkin attacks
what he calls "the semantic sting."' 23 This is his pejorative term for the
mind-set that "we can argue sensibly with one another if, but only if, we
all accept and follow the same criteria for deciding when our claims are
sound, even if we cannot state exactly, as a philosopher might hope to do,
what these criteria are." 24 Dworkin maintains, on the contrary, that
"members of particular communities who share practices and traditions"
can have genuine disagreements about the requirements of those tradi-
tions and practices in "concrete circumstances... even though [these]
people use different criteria in forming or framing [their] interpretations;
15. R. DwoxuiN, supra note 2, at 3.
16. Ia at 5.
17. Ia
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id at 14.
21. Id at 33.
22. Id at 37.
23. Id at 45-46.
24. Id at 45.
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[this disagreement] is genuine because the competing interpretations are
directed toward the same objects or events of interpretation."2-
Taking the social practice of "courtesy" as a possible paradigm,
Dworkin maintains that those who participate in the practice may well
over time develop an "'interpretive' attitude towards the rules of cour-
tesy."126 The interpretive attitude has two components: first, it starts
from "the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist
but has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some
principle-in short, that it has some point-that can be stated indepen-
dently ofjust describing the rules that make up the practice." 27 Second,
it accepts "the further assumption that the requirements of courtesy...
are not necessarily or exclusively what they have always been taken to be
but are instead sensitive to its point, so that the strict rules must be un-
derstood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited by
that point."m Once the interpretive attitude takes hold, the social prac-
tice or institution ceases to be mechanical. 'Teople now try to impose
meaning on the institution-to see it in its best light--and then to
restructure it in the light of that meaning." 29 This is the nub of Dwor-
kin's argument; it is the approach that he utilizes over and over again
throughout the remainder of the book.
Dworkin's argument, of course, is that if we wish to understand law
we must adopt the interpretive attitude. That is, we must accept that law
must have a point, and we must construe individual legal provisions in
the light of what we conceive that point to be. For Dworkin's argument,
however, it is essential that the interpretive attitude we adopt not be a
form of "conversational interpretation" that "assigns meaning in the
light of the motives and purposes and concerns it supposes the speaker to
have, and reports its conclusions as statements about his 'intention' in
saying what he did. ' 30 Rather the interpretation of a social practice like
courtesy or law is like "artistic interpretation." 31 They are, in short,
types of "creative interpretation." Dworkin declares:
I shall defend a different solution: that creative interpretation is not
conversational but constructive. Interpretation of works of art and so-
cial practices, I shall argue, is indeed essentially concerned with pur-
pose not cause. But the purposes in play are not (fundamentally) those
of some author but of the interpreter. Roughly, constructive interpre-
25. Md at 46.
26. Id at 47.
27. Md
28. Md
29. Md
30. ML at 50.
31. Md
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tation is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order
to make of it the best possible example of the form or genre to which it
is taken to belong. It does not follow, even from that rough account,
that an interpreter can make of a practice or work of art anything he
would have wanted it to be, that a citizen of courtesy who is enthralled
by equality, for example, can in good faith claim that courtesy actually
requires the sharing of wealth. For the history or shape of a practice
or object constrains the available interpretations of it, though the char-
acter of that constraint needs careful accounting, as we shall see. Crea-
tive interpretation, on the constructive view, is a matter of interaction
between purpose and object.32
Understanding a social practice, accordingly, is something different from
understanding what other participants mean by the statements they
make while they are engaged in that practice. Instead of merely observ-
ing and interpreting data, "a social scientist must participate in a social
practice if he hopes to understand it, as distinguished from understand-
ing its members." 33
Because Dworkin lays so much importance on the similarity be-
tween the creative interpretation of social practices and artistic interpre-
tation, he must defend his assertion that artistic interpretation is not
"inevitably a matter of discovering some author's intention,] .., a fac-
tual process independent of the interpreter's own values." 34 Dworkin be-
gins his defense by rejecting any sharp distinction "between discovering
an artist's intention and finding value in what he has done."' 35 Dworkin
accepts the suggestion that "[a]n insight belongs to an artist's intention
... when it fits and illuminates his artistic purposes in a way he would
recognize and endorse even though he has not already done so.3 6 This
technique, of course, can be applied to authors that have long been dead.
Most importantly, Dworkin contends that this approach "brings the in-
terpreter's sense of artistic value into his reconstruction of the artist's
intention in at least an evidential way, for the interpreter's judgment of
what an author would have accepted will be guided by his sense of what
the author should have accepted, that is, his sense of which reading
would make the work better and which would make it worse."37 Apply-
ing this approach to the interpretation of social practices, Dworkin re-
jects "the thesis that creative interpretation aims to discover some actual
historical intention" but nevertheless maintains that "the concept of in-
32. Id. at 52.
33. Id. at 55.
34. Id
35. Id.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id.
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tention... provides theforma! structure for all interpretive claims. '38
Interpretation
is by nature the report of a purpose; it proposes a way of seeing what is
interpreted-a social practice or tradition as much as a text or a paint-
ing-as if this were the product of a decision to pursue one set of
themes or visions or purposes, one "point" rather than another.39
This is true even when what is being interpreted is a social practice, that
is, "even when there is no historical author whose historical mind can be
plumbed."' 4
In his discussion of artistic interpretation as the paradigm of the
creative interpretation of social practices, Dworkin makes some conces-
sions to the critics who have attacked him ever since he turned his atten-
tion to the question of interpretation. He concedes, under attack from
Stanley Fish,41 "that interpreters think within a tradition from which
they cannot wholly escape." 42  Dworkin inserts the qualification
"wholly" because he will not accept the conclusion that "it is a mistake
to think one interpretive opinion really can be better than another."43
He is, of course, bound to resist that conclusion because he rejects the
assertion "that there can be no right answers to hard [legal] cases but
only different answers."44 Dworkin uses the analogy to artistic interpre-
tation to support his contrary assertion.
II.
The notion that Dworkin wishes to carry forward from this prelimi-
nary discussion of methodology is that, in interpreting a social practice
like courtesy or law, one is not engaged in reporting what the partici-
pants in the practice mean but in determining "what it means." 45 This is
important because Dworkin recognizes that the participants do not al-
ways agree on what the point of the practice (or the law) is. They must,
of course, share the dictionary and
what Wittgenstein called a form of life sufficiently concrete so that the
one can recognize sense and purpose in what the other says and
does.... But this similarity of interests and convictions need hold
only to a point: it must be sufficiently dense to permit genuine disa-
38. Id at 58.
39. Id at 58-59.
40. Id at 59.
41. Fish, Wrong Again, 62 TEx L. REV. 299 (1983); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang:. Inter-
pretation in Law and Literature, 60 T_.m L. REv. 551 (1982).
42. R. DwoRKIN, supra note 2, at 61-62. Although Dworkin does cite Fish, see id at 66 n.16,
the citation comes several pages later and in a somewhat different context.
43. I at 77.
44. Idl
45. Id at 63.
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greement, but not so dense that disagreement cannot break out.
As Dworkin sees it, the interpretive enterprise has three stages.
First, there is a" 'preinterpretive stage in which the rules and standards
taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are identified."47
Second, "[tihere must be an interpretive stage at which the interpreter
settles on some general justification for the main elements of the practice
identified at the preinterpretive stage."48 This process will consist of ar-
guments as to "why a practice of that general shape is worth pursuing," 49
if it is worth pursuing at all. Third, "there must be a postinterpretive or
reforming stage" at which the interpreter "adjusts his sense of what the
practice 'really' requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts
at the interpretive stage."150 In engaging in this enterprise, our hypotheti-
cal interpreter needs several types of convictions and assumptions. At
the outset, "[hie needs assumptions or convictions about what counts as
part of the practice in order to define the raw data of his interpretation at
the preinterpretive stage."151 Next, he "needs convictions about how far
the justification he proposes at the interpretive stage must fit the standing
features of the practice to count as an interpretation of it rather than the
invention of something new."' 52 These second types of convictions might
collectively be considered the interpreter's sense of what 'fits." Finally,
the interpreter "need[s] more substantive convictions about which kinds
of justification really would show the practice in the best light."' 53 These
last convictions will flow from the interpreter's ultimate values, his sense
of justice, if you will.
To those who are skeptical of his project of interpretation, Dworkin
replies that the only type of skepticism about his enterprise that is intel-
lectually coherent is "internal skepticism," which he contrasts to "exter-
nal skepticism." 54 For Dworkin, "[e]xtemal skepticism is a metaphysical
theory, not an interpretive or moral position. s55 The external skeptic
does not say that it is a mistake to think of a play as having a point or of
a social practice as possessing or failing to possess moral value. He
merely insists that such statements "are not descriptions that can be
proved or tested like physics."' 56 The external critic will have opinions of
46. Id. at 63-64.
47. I at 65-66.
48. Id at 66.
49. Id
50. Id
51. I at 67.
52. Id
53. IM
54. Id at 78-86.
55. Id at 79.
56. Id. at 79-80.
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his own about the interpretation of a play (say Hamlet), or about the
worth of a social practice (say slavery), but he will insist "that all of these
opinions are projected upon, not discovered in 'reality.' ",57 The external
skeptic relies very much on the fact that different cultures view moral
issues differently and the fact that there is often disagreement even within
cultures. To Dworkin, such evidence in no way proves that there are not
right answers to moral, and hence legal, questions.
The internal skeptic, by contrast, particularly one motivated by
what Dworkin calls "global internal skepticism,"5 8 believes that no inter-
pretation of a social practice or of anything else can be right or wrong,
that judgments about moral issues are personal, like judgments about
flavors of ice cream. Global internal skepticism is a coherent intellectual
position, but Dworkin doubts that many people consistently adopt it.
One cannot adopt the internal skeptic's position in philosophical debate
and then turn around and say "but, personally, I believe slavery to be
wrong." Anyone who believes that slavery is wrong, whether that person
is an internal skeptic or an external skeptic, is committed to there being a
right answer to the question of slavery, namely, that it is wrong.5 9
At the same time, Dworkin wants to make it clear that he rejects
any form of conventionalism. Specifically, he wants to make it clear that
he rejects the notion that we can agree on the right answers to legal ques-
tions because there are certain authorities-statutes and precedents-and
certain forms of argument that are accepted as conclusive.6 Neverthe-
less, without withdrawing his insistence that discussion of law and justice
is possible despite the "difficulty in finding any adequate statement of the
concept ofjustice," Dworkin maintains that some "abstract account that
organizes further argument about law's character" would be helpful.61
He then continues:
Our discussions about law by and large assume, I suggest, that the
most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice is to guide and
constrain the power of government in the following way. Law insists
that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be
to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as
licensed or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing
from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.62
Proceeding from this general statement of the point of law, he declares
57. IM at 80.
58. Id at 79, 84.
59. See a2 at 80-86.
60. Id. at 87-150.
61. Id. at 93.
62. Id.
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that he is proposing a model of "law as integrity. '6 3 Law as integrity
refuses to accept the conclusion of legal pragmatism which "denies that a
community secures any special benefit by requiring that judges' adjudica-
tive decisions be checked by any supposed right of litigants to consis-
tency with other political decisions made in the past."64 Rather,
[l]ike conventionalism, [law as integrity] accepts law and legal rights
wholeheartedly... It supposes that law's constraints benefit society
not just by providing predictability or procedural fairness, or in some
other instrumental way, but by securing a kind of equality among citi-
zens that makes their community more genuine and improves its moral
justification for exercising the political power it does.65
The notion of law as integrity emphasizes again the connection
among law, politics, and morality. Dworkin's analysis is subtle, how-
ever. He distinguishes between "popular morality" and "true justice."' 6
Dworkin's conceptual account of law 'is different from each [of these
concepts] because its content may depend on the other."67 As thus
presented, Dworkin's model of law as integrity differs from the model of
law as conventionalism not because law as integrity is not concerned with
what people believe is good or bad but because law as integrity is a more
general conception of law. As such, it "must also have external connec-
tions to other parts or departments of political morality and, through
these, to more general ideological and even metaphysical convictions."'68
Dworkin's rejection of conventionalism is not based on theoretical
considerations alone. As a theoretical description of practice, conven-
tionalism does not work. If a judge adopts the attitude of strict conven-
tionalism, before a new case could be said to be governed by the existing
legal sources it would have to be part of the explicit extension of those
sources. Dworkin maintains that such an extension is "the set of pro-
positions which (almost) everyone said to be a party to the convention
actually accepts as part of its extension." 69 Where this agreement does
not exist-and it is a known fact that it often does not-there will be
gaps in the law, because conscientious judges often disagree about what
the accepted sources of law say about the case before them. Strict con-
ventionalism provides no way of filling these gaps other than through
"the exercise of extralegal judicial discretion." 70 If, on the other hand, a
63. Id at 94.
64. Id at 95.
65. Id at 95-96.
66. Id at 96-98.
67. Id. at 96.
68. Id at 101 Because law as integrity is an "interpretive concept," it is less troubled by the
semantic controversies of whether Nazi law was indeed law. Id at 103-08.
69. Id at 123.
70. Id. at 126.
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judge adopts what might be called "soft conventionalism," he is prepared
to acknowledge that "the law of a community includes everything within
the implicit extension of these conventions."71 But soft conventionalism,
with its focus on what is "implicitly" in the existing legal materials, is "a
very abstract undeveloped form of law as integrity... [that] rejects the
divorce between law and politics that conventionalist theory... tries to
secure." 72 Soft conventionalism neither protects expectations by restrict-
ing the exercise of collective force to situations where widely accepted
conventions make its application uncontroversial nor does it clearly iden-
tify those supposed special situations where there is no law.73 Only strict
conventionalism can do that. Strict conventionalism is inadequate, how-
ever, not merely because it gives judges a vast degree of discretion, which
we may find objectionable on theoretical grounds, but because of the
more prosaic fact that judges do not accept it:
[O]ur judges actually pay more attention to so-called conventional
sources of law like statutes and precedents then conventionalism al-
lows them to do. A self-consciously strict conventionalist judge would
lose interest in legislation and precedent at just the point when it be-
came clear that the explicit extension of these supposed conventions
had run out.74
Actual judicial practice "make[s] sense only on the assumption that the
law judges have an obligation to enforce depends on the 'correct' reading
[of a statute] even when it is controversial what that is.""5 If we are
tempted to choose conventionalism because we are seeking a balance be-
tween certainty and flexibility, Dworkin argues that we would be far bet-
ter advised to choose pragmatism. 76
Dworkin, of course, is not about to choose pragmatism himself. If
pragmatism were the guiding force in legal decisionmaking, it would
mean that judges, in deciding cases on the basis of the purported rights of
the parties, were engaged in deception on a grand scale. They would in,
Dworkin's terms, be deciding the case "as if' the parties had rights.77 In
so doing they would be engaged in a "noble lie."78 How far the courts
would attempt to disguise what they were doing would itself be deter-
mined for a pragmatist by the strategic question of whether "the commu-
nity [is] so anxious that its judges not behave as pragmatists that this
71. Ia at 124.
72. aId at 127-29.
73. IdL at 128.
74. IdL at 130.
75. Id at 131.
76. Ia at 149.
77. Id at 151-55.
78. Id at 155, 159.
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'noble lie' will help him serve its true interests better in the long run."'79
It comes as no surprise that Dworkin turns again to law as integrity as
the only possible model of the legal system worthy of acceptance.
II.
Dworkin begins his more intensive discussion of the model of integ-
rity by explicitly declaring that he will personify the community and its
political manifestation, the state, as a single distinct moral agent.80 It is
only in this way that it will be possible for him to discuss the coherence
and integrity of a community's legal system and its conception ofjustice.
For the same reasons, Dworkin insists that a community can have princi-
ples that are distinct from those of the officials who act in the commu-
nity's name.81 Dworkin will concede, as the discussion unfolds, that it
will be impossible to bring all the discrete rules and other standards that
form a society's legal system into one single coherent scheme, but "[o]ur
commitment to integrity means... that we must report this fact as a
defect.., and that we must strive to remedy whatever inconsistencies in
principle we are forced to confront. '8 2
The society that Dworkin envisions is one in which the members of
the community have obligations toward the community and the officials
have duties that flow from the fact that they are acting in the name of a
community 8 3 The obligations of the members of a community follow
from the fact that, as members of a community, they have received the
benefits of the community.
Dworkin's discussion of communal obligation is one of the more
convincing parts of Law's Empire. He rejects consent as the source of
political obligation. There never has been an actual social contract and
the notion of tacit consent is not an adequate substitute. Even if we con-
sciously decide not to emigrate, the argument that this constitutes the
type of consent that legitimizes government "wonld fail... because a
person leaves one sovereign only to join another; he has no choice to be
free from sovereigns altogether." 84 Dworkin also finds inadequate the
more currently popular notion that political obligation is bottomed on
notions of "fair play." The argument that political obligation is based on
considerations of fair play is premised on the questionable notion that
"people can incur obligations simply by receiving what they do not seek
79. Id. at 155.
80. Id. at 167-75.
81. Id. at 172.
82. Id. at 217.
83. Id. at 167-216.
84. Id. at 193.
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and would reject if they had the chance."85 Moreover, the "fair play"
argument assumes that people benefit from political organization. If the
argument requires that, in order to incur political obligations, we must be
better off in the system under which we are living than "under any other
system that might have developed in its place,"8' 6 then it is too strong a
condition. If the argument merely requires that we be better off under
the society in which we live then we would be in a state of anarchy, then
it is too weak.87
For Dworkin, "associative obligations," such as those of family,
neighborhood, even of friendship, can arise independently of our choos-
ing to assume them."" These obligations arise through a shared history.
Such associational obligations require a kind of reciprocity, but the reci-
procity required is not that one person must do for another what the
latter thinks the obligations, say of friendship, concretely require. If that
were true, "friendship would only be possible between people who shared
a detailed conception of friendship and would become automatically
more contractual and deliberative than it is, more a matter of people
checking in advance to see whether their conceptions matched well
enough to allow them to be friends."8' 9 At this point Dworkin turns
again to the concept of integrity and the interpretive attitude that under-
lies it:
Friends have a responsibility to treat one another as friends, and that
means, put subjectively, that each act out of a conception of friendship
he is ready to recognize as vulnerable to an interpretive test, as open to
the objection that this is not a plausible account of what friendship
means in our culture.90
The notion that the political association of the members of a state
can be analogized to friendship is, of course, at least as old as Aristotle.91
Dworkin extracts his version of that notion from the concept of "genuine
fraternal obligations." 92 He describes the circumstances in which people
will be regarded as having such fraternal obligations as follows:
First, they must regard the group's obligations as special, holding dis-
tinctly within the group, rather than as general duties its members owe
equally to persons outside it. Second, they must accept that these re-
sponsibilities are personal: that they run directly from each member to
85. d at 194.
86. I.
87. rdL
88. See ia at 195-216.
89. I at 198.
90. d at 199.
91. See ETHIcA NCOMACHEA (bks. VIII, X), in 9 THE WoRKs oF ARsrOTLE TRANSLATED
INTO ENGLISH (W.D. Ross trans. 1925).
92. R. DwoRN, supra note 2, at 199.
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each other member, not just to the group as a whole in some collective
sense....
Third, members must see these responsibilities as flowing from a
more general responsiblity each has of concern for the well-being of
others in the group; they must treat discrete obligations that arise only
under special circumstances, like the obligation to help a friend who is
in great financial need, as derivative from and expressing a more gen-
eral responsibility active throughout the association in different
ways....
Fourth, members must suppose that the group's practices show
not only concern but an equal concern for all members. Fraternal as-
sociations are in that sense conceptually egalitarian.93
Dworkin, in sum, wants to distinguish between a "bare community" and
a "true community.' ' 94 It is his conclusion that
legitimacy-the right of a political community to treat its members as
having obligations in virtue of collective community decisions-is to be
found not in the hard terrain of contracts or duties ofjustice or obliga-
tions of fair play that might hold among strangers, but in the more
fertile ground of fraternity, community, and their attendant
obligations. 95
Political association is like family and friendship and other forms of asso-
ciation that are "more local and intimate."96
It should now be obvious how Dworkin integrates this discussion of
political obligation with the general thesis of his book. He is concerned,
in his own words, "with the interpretive question of what character of
mutual concern and responsibility our political practices must express in
order to justify the assumption of true community we seem to make."'97
Dworkin quickly rejects the notion of a political community as merely "a
de facto accident of history and geography."981 He likewise rejects the
"rulebook model" of a community that "supposes that members of a
political community accept a general commitment to obey rules estab-
lished in a certain way that is special to that community." 99 The mem-
bers of such a community, even if "wholly honest," can be "self-
interested." They may well "obey the rules they have accepted or negoti-
ated as a matter of obligation and not merely strategy, but they assume
that the content of these rules exhausts their obligation."10 0' The rules in
such a community "represent a compromise between antagonistic inter-
93. IM at 199-200.
94. IM. at 201-02.
95. Ia at 206.
96. IM
97. Id. at 209.
98. IM.
99. IM at 209-10..
100. It at 210.
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ests or points of view."10 1 Such a view of community, of course, resem-
bles the already rejected point of view of the person who looks at law
with the model of conventionalism in mind. For Dworkin, neither the
"de facto" community nor the "rulebook community" is a "true commu-
nity." Only the "model of principle" permits us to view the political
community as a true community:
Members of a society of principle accept that their political rights and
duties are not exhausted by the particular decisios their political insti-
tutions have reached, but depend, more generally, on the scheme of
principles those decisions presuppose and endorse.102
A community based on the model of principle will, of course, accept the
notion of integrity as the guiding force in legal argument.
IV.
In presenting the "model of principle" and the central place it fills in
the notion of "law as integrity" that has just been described, Dworkin
makes some interesting observations about the role of legislators. In
what I believe is the clearest language that he has ever used on this sub-
ject, Dworkin openly asserts that the notion of law as integrity applies to
legislators as well as courts.10 3 He could not do otherwise now that he
has openly espoused the view that judicial decisionmaking is itself also a
form of political decisionmaking. As such, judicial decisionmaking is not
different in kind from legislative decisionmaking. If the former must be
committed to integrity, why not the latter? The problem that Dworkin
sees in applying the view of law as integrity to the legislative arena arises
from so-caled "internal compromises" and the temptation to enact
checkerboard statutes. A checkerboard statute might, for example, in-
volve a compromise in which strict liability is imposed on manufacturers
of automobiles but not on, say, manufacturers of washing machines. 10
The problem is a difficult one because, as Dworkin points out:
Of course we do accept arbitrary distinctions about some matters:
zoning, for example. We accept that shops or factories be forbidden in
some zones and not others and that parking be prohibited on alternate
sides of the same street on alternate days. But we reject a division
between parties of opinion when matters of principle are at stake. We
follow a different model: that each point of view must be allowed a
voice in the process of deliberation but that the collective decision
must nevertheless aim to settle on some coherent principle whose influ-
ence then extends to the natural limits of its authority. If there must
101. Id
102. I at 211.
103. See id at 217-19.
104. See id at 217-18.
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be compromise because people are divided about justice, then the com-
promise must be external, not internal; it must be a compromise about
which scheme of justice to adopt rather than a compromised scheme of
justice.105
I shall return to this question after Dworkin's thesis has been completely
set out. For the moment, recall that Dworkin sees "integrity" as the
(best) resolution of the sometimes conflicting claims of fairness and jus-
tice. As applied to legislation, the legislature must never "enact checker-
board statutes just out of a concern for fairness."10 6 But that is not to say
a checkerboard solution is never justified. Sometimes considerations of
justice must prevail:
Integrity condemns the result, but justice recommends it [that is, the
compromise checkerboard statute] over no change at all, and on bal-
ance half the loaf might be better than none. The legislature would
abandon its general commitment to integrity, and so forfeit the argu-
ment for legitimacy... if it made that choice in every case or even
characteristically. But that does not mean it should never choose jus-
tice over integrity. 0 7
The judiciary is more constrained, but Dworkin clearly accepts that the
"adjudicative principle of integrity [is not] absolutely sovereign over
what judges must do at the end of the day."1 08 Dworkin's point is that
the principle of adjudicative integrity "is decisive over what a judge rec-
ognizes as law,"10 9 but not decisive of how a judge should decide particu-
lar cases. The example Dworkin gives is the Fugitive Slave Act. If,
under the principle of integrity, the Fugitive Slave Act had to be consid-
ered part of the law of the United States, the judge should consider
whether his sense of justice would allow him to "actually enforce it on
the demand of a slave owner, or whether he should lie and say that this
was not the law after all, or whether he should resign."' 10 It is interest-
ing that Dworkin uses events of some 130 or more years ago as an exam-
ple. The way he tells the story is as important as the story he tells.
V.
The question, then, to which Dworkin has been leading the reader,
is how does integrity figure in the interpretive exercise that Dworkin as-
serts is the essence of judicial decisionmaking? According to what
Dworkin terms "law as integrity," propositions of law are true if they
105. Id. at 179 (footnote omitted).
106. Ird at 217.
107. Ird at 218. Dworkin is discussing a statute imposing strict liability only upon automobile
manufacturers.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 219.
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figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural
due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the com-
munity's legal practice."' In more concrete terms, a judge seeking to
decide a particular case must decide whether "legal practice is seen in a
better light if we assume the community has accepted" one principle
rather than another." 2 Dworkin recognizes that history will be impor-
tant, but the notion of integrity being put forward by him "does not re-
quire consistency in principle over all stages of a community's law";
integrity "commands a horizontal rather than vertical consistency of
principle across the range of legal standards the community now en-
forces.""u 3 Throughout this process Dworkin never lets us forget the
contention with which he launched his academic career: that "the law-
the rights and duties that flow from past collective decisions and for that
reason license or require coercion--contains not ouly the narrow explicit
content of these decisions but also, more broadly, the scheme of princi-
ples necessary to justify them.""14
Dworkin then proceeds, along grounds he has made familiar in re-
cent years, to analogize the development of the law to the writing of a
chain novel." s Each succeeding author is obliged to search for the inter-
pretation of the text supplied to him that best fits that text. Dworkin
recognizes that it may be impossible to come up with an interpretation
that explains every "major structural aspect of the text.""16 The chain
novelist will then be forced to look for interpretations that fit the bulk of
the text and, if more than one such interpretation presents itself, he must
then 'Judge which of these eligible readings makes the work in progress
best, all things considered."" 7 Some interpretations may fit more of the
text; others will be more interesting, perhaps making the novel "substan-
tively better.""" It is of course possible that no interpretation will sur-
vive even the "relaxed test"" 9 of conformity with the bulk of the text.
One would then have to abandon the task. But the point Dworkin wants
to make, with its obvious application to legal interpretation, is that "you
cannot know in advance that you will reach that skeptical result"; 20
rather, "the wise-sounding judgment that no one interpretation could be
111. Id at 225.
112. Id at 226.
113. Id at 227 (emphasis added).
114. IAd
115. See id at 228-38.
116. rd7 at 230.
117. Id at 231.
118. Id at 235.
119. Id at 237.
120. Id
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best must be earned and defended like any other interpretive claim."121
The chain novel analogy of course cannot automatically be applied
to the project of legal interpretation. To begin with, as Dworkin himself
notes, the project of coming up with the "best story" to encompass the
so-called legal text is that of seeking "the best story... from the stand-
point of political morality, not aesthetics."22 More importantly, it re-
quires the acceptance of Dworkin's contention that "[tihe adjudicative
principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties,
so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single
author-the community personified--expressing a coherent conception
of justice and fairness,"'12 a requirement that many people would dismiss
as absurd. In the succeeding pages, Dworkin resurrects his faithful alter
ego Hercules and applies the technique of interpretation he has just de-
scribed to a series of cases. He begins with McLoughlin v. O'Brian, 124 a
case in which the House of Lords allowed a women to recover damages
for emotional harm suffered, when, about an hour and a half after a mo-
tor vehicle accident in which one of her children was killed and her hus-
band and several other children were injured, she saw "her surviving
daughter begrimed with dirt and oil," her husband with "his shirt hang-
ing off him" and who "started sobbing" when he saw her, and her surviv-
ing son "the whole of [whose] left face and left side was covered." 12
When the girl "had been cleaned up ... [she] was too upset to speak and
simply clung to her mother.' ' 26 I will have occasion to consider Dwor-
kin's discussion of McLoughlin later 27 when I make some general criti-
cisms of Law's Empire. Dworkin then applies his interpretive technique
to cases of statutory interpretation and constitutional adjudication.
Along the way Dworkin argues against an economic interpretation of the
common law. Because the theories of the law and economics school and
the popular moral theory of utilitarianism are not, in Dworkin's view,
morally sufficient justifications of legal practice, neither is acceptable:
"[an] interpretation must not only fit but also justify the practice it inter-
prets."128 The law and economics theories are unacceptable because we
do not have a moral duty to maximize wealth, 29 and utilitarianism fails
as a justification because "people do not accept [the] strict requirement
121. Id. at 237-38.
122. Id. at 239.
123. Id. at 225.
124. [1983] 1 A.C. 410 (1982).
125. Id. at 417. The facts are stated in the speech of Lord Wilbefforce.
126. Id.
127. See Infra notes 211-16 and accompanying text.
128. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 285.
129. See id at 286-88.
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always to consider other people's interests as equal in importance to their
oWn.3"
13 0
When Dworkin turns to statutory interpretation, it is no surprise to
find that his alter ego, Hercules, "will treat Congress as an author earlier
than himself in the chain of law, though an author with special powers
and responsibilities different from his own." 131 Hercules "will see his
own role as fundamentally the creative one of a partner continuing to
develop, in what he believes is the best way, the statutory scheme Con-
gress began." 132 Dworkin labors to show how lesser judges, such as Her-
mes, will be driven in the end to adopt the interpretive approach of
Hercules. Hermes may begin by believing that, in interpreting the con-
tested provisions of a statute, he should be governed by the hopes and
expectations of the legislator whose statements appear in the legislative
record. He will, however, end up concluding
that the speaker's meaning theory of statutory interpretation requires
taking [legislator] Smith's intentions to lie in her convictions, that is,
her beliefs about what justice or sound policy would require, which
may, of course, be different from either her hopes or her
expectations. 133
Hermes will not look to "Smith's hopes or expectations or to what she
would have done in circumstances that did not arise but to the political
convictions out of which she voted for the act, or would have if she had
been voting on pinciple."13 4 Ultimately, Hermes will conclude "that
statutes should be read to promote the aims of a community of principle,
that is, that they should be read to express a coherent scheme of convic-
130. Ia at 294. The point that people generally do not always consider other people's interests
equal to their own is made best i. at 292. In the final pages of chapter eight, where these issues of
common law adjudication are considered, Dworkin concludes that if, as he himself is inclined to do,
a person accepts equality of resources as a "better overall interpretation of his community's property
scheme... then he should adopt a view of his private responsibilities that produces market-stimulat-
ing choices on most occasions when abstract legal rights compete." Id. at 301-02. Even if one
believes that resources have been distributed unequally, one would "normally have no reason to
presume anything about the direction of the inequality with respect to the particular people [one's]
act will affect." Ia at 305. Dworkin appears to be trying to concede that there is something to the
law and economics school and, at the same time, show that his concept of equality is not vulnerable
to Nozick's criticism that any scheme that requires equality as an end-state of social processes will
require an elaborate coercive structure through which the state is able to prevent people from mak-
ing imprudent bargains. See L Nozici,, ANARCHY, STATF, AND UTOPIA 160-64 (1974). Dworkin
limits his obeisance to the law and economics school to situations in which abstract rights compete.
Where no such rights are involved, Dworkin makes clear that legislatures, in forming and imple-
menting policy, are not constrained by economic considerations. See R. Dwom, supra note 2, at
310-12.
131. Id. at 313.
132. Ia
133. Id. at 324.
134. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
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tion dominant within the legislature that enacted them."135
The case that Dworkin uses as the focus of his discussion is the
"snail darter" case 136 in which the Supreme Court interpreted the En-
dangered Species Act to require the halting of a virtually completed fed-
eral dam and power project.137 Dworkin assumes that his hypothetical
legislator, Smith, has expressed her opinion that the TVA project in ques-
tion should be halted to save the snail darter. Dworkin, on the contrary,
believes the decision, since overruled by Congress, was a mistake and
wants to show why. As Dworkin sees the case, it all boils down to
whether the Secretary of the Interior would have acted reasonably if he
had not listed the snail darter as an endangered species under the Act.
The issue thus is whether Smith would be opposed to reasonable conduct
on the part of the Secretary. Obviously she would not. Now, suppose
Smith believed it would have been unreasonable for the Secretary to fail
to list the snail darter, would that not force the Court's hand? Not for
Dworkin, because Dworkin takes it as given that Smith does "not think
that the Secretary should have no power to make decisions she regards as
unreasonable-that would be an extraordinary opinion-but that he
should not have power to make decisions that are in fact unreasona-
ble." 138 For Dworkin, "[n]o other reading of her conviction makes sense
of it as a conviction." Thus, Hermes
will probably decide that [Smith's] opinion about the snail darter is,
within the larger set of her more general opinions, a mistake. He will
then think he respects her convictions as a whole better by ignoring her
concrete opinion about the snail darter and allowing the dam to
open.139
This is quite a tour de force!
In considering how statutes should be construed, as in the discus-
sion of all other types of judicial decisiomaking, we eventually return to
Hercules. We supposedly now see how the conclusion Dworkin supports
in the snail darter case follows from Hercules' idea that statutes must be
read in whatever way follows from the best interpretation of the legisla-
tive process as a whole." 14° For each statute that he is asked to enforce,
Hercules constructs a justification that "fits and flows through that stat-
ute and is, if possible, consistent with other legislation in force."1 41 This
approach, asserts Dworkin, "might lead him to reject an interpretation
135. I .at 330.
136. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
137. See R. DwoRxiN, supra note 2, at 313-54.
138. Id at 333.
139. IM
140. Id. at 337.
141. IM. at 338.
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that would be closer to the concrete intentions of the draftsman."1 42 It is
not that Hercules is cavalier with legislative history. It is just that "offi-
cial statements of purpose... should be treated as themselves acts of the
state personified." These statements are "political decisions" embraced
by the "command of integrity."' 43 In short, Hercules aims to make the
legislative story, as a whole, as good as it can be.144 Thus, while Hercules
will treat "the formal statements that make up legislative history as acts
of the state," he will not treat them as "part of the statute itself."145 This
is an important point because it enables Dworkin to argue that a statute's
meaning is not fixed at a particular moment of time. Hercules will look
to
whichever expression of political views seems relevant to deciding
whether a particular statute constructed according to an interpretation
he is considering would be fair, given the character and spread of pub-
lic opinion. In this context the televised address of an important politi-
cian might be more important than the fine print of a committee
report.146
Using the snail darter case again as an example, Dworkin concludes that
Hercules will "look not to public opinion at the beginning, when conser-
vation was in flower, but now, when it must be decided whether the Sec-
retary can waste large public funds to save a minor species." 147 For
Dworkin, fairness requires this approach to legislative history because
declarations found in that history "are reports of public purpose and con-
viction, and so they are naturally vulnerable to reassessment."' 4 As
statutes age, people have less reason to rely on these declarations. They
may have been "supplemented and perhaps replaced, as formal interpre-
tations of public commitment, by a variety of other interpretive explana-
tions attached to later statutes on related issues."149 Consequently,
"Hercules will pay less and less attention to the original legislative his-
tory." In the end,
Hercules interprets history in motion, because the story he must make
as good as it can be is the whole story through his decision and beyond.
He does not amend out-of-date statutes to suit new times, as the meta-
physics of speaker's meaning [theories] would suggest. He recognizes
what the old statutes have since become.150
142. Id. at 447 n.7.
143. Id at 343.
144. Id at 348.
145. Id at 346.
146. Id at 349.
147. Id
148. Id at 350.
149. Id
150. Id
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VI.
Dworkin finally turns to constitutional adjudication. He begins by
discussing liberal and conservative judges, concluding that "[t]he distinc-
tion between [them] is inexact and unlikely to contribute much to any
serious account of constitutional adjudication." 151 Even the more recent
distinction between "interpretivist and noninterpretivist camps" is
"highly misleading."'152 These labels
suggest a distinction between judges who believe constitutional deci-
sions should be made only or mainly by interpreting the Constitution
itself and others who think they should be based on extraconstitutional
grounds. This is an academic form of the crude popular mistake that
some judges obey the Constitution and others disregard it.153
These notions are a mistake because, as the reader is now well aware,
they ignore "the philosophical character of law as interpretive."'1 4 Us-
ing the important question of how segregation in schools comports with
the fourteenth amendment as the focus of his discussion, Dworkin has
Hercules respond to the criticism of Brown v. Board of Education 55 that
is premised on the proposition that those lawmakers who voted for the
fourteenth amendment did not think they were outlawing racially segre-
gated education. Applying the techniques that he used in construing
statutes, Hercules focuses not on what these lawmakers may or may not
have said (or thought) about segregated education, but on their dominant
conviction: to treat all citizens as equals. Thus, even an historicist, if he
"believes that racial segregation is inconsistent with the conception of
equality the framers accepted at a more abstract level, will think that
fidelity to their convictions as a whole requires holding segregation un-
constitutional."15 6 Such a person might also hold "a different view: that
circumstances have changed so that although segregation was consistent
with that conception in the late nineteenth century, it is not consistent
now."3157 In short, like Hermes before him, a hypothetical historicist is
driven to reject speaker's meaning approaches and to approximate the
methods of Hercules who, as we know, is searching for a political theory
that makes the constitutional story a better story when the Constitution
is read in one way rather than another. To use Dworkin's own words:
It would be silly to take the opinions of those who first voted on the
Fourteenth Amendment as reporting the public morality of the United
151. Id. at 359.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 359-60.
154. Id. at 360.
155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
156. R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 362.
157. Id.
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States a century later, when the racial issue had been transformed in
almost every way. It would also be perverse; it would deny that com-
munity the power to change its public sense of purpose, which means
denying that it can have public purposes at all.158
After making this claim, Dworkin sets out to meet the argument
that stability and predictability require that constitutional adjudication
be tied to the concrete intentions of its authors. In its stronger version,
this argument means that the courts will not "overturn some legislative
or executive decision unless historical scholarship has demonstrated that
this result was intended in a concrete way."' 5 9 In its weaker version,
"[n]o statute or decision will be overturned if it can be shown on histori-
cal grounds that the framers expected that it would not be."160 Dworkin
asks if either of these versions of historicism offer "a decent interpreta-
tion of American constitutional practice." 61 He concludes that "[the
stronger version does not fit that practice at all" and that "[t]he weaker
version fits the practice better just because it is weaker and it may fit well
enough to survive if the argument from stability is strong enough in sub-
stance."1 62 In short, the question becomes, how strong an argument of
political morality is the argument from stability? Dworkin suggests an
answer to that question by asking how plausible it is to make the "correct
interpretation of [the] Constitution depend on the concrete opinions of its
authors, no matter how dated these may be, rather than on fresh, con-
temporary interpretive decisions that may contradict" them. 63
For Dworkin, the historicist's argument is wanting in persuasive
power because it "relies most on the importance of certainty when that
virtue is least important to good government." 16 As to some issues,
such as the term of the President's office, it matters more that the law be
settled than what the law is-165 As to another class of issues, stability is
also important, but it is not always more important than the details of
what has been decided. Decisions on the allocation of power required by
the overall scheme of federalism are placed by Dworkin into this class.
Then there is, he argues, a class of cases where the issue is one of princi-
ple, where substance is more important than the historicist idea of stabil-
ity. These cases involve construction of those clauses of the Constitution
that recognize individual rights against the state: freedom of speech, due
158. d at 365.
159. I d at 366.
160. I
161. a
162. I
163. d at 367.
164. Id
165. See I d at 3 65-69 (discussing the importance of stability in various types of constitutional
adjudication).
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process in criminal prosecutions, and "treatment as an equal in the dis-
position of public resources, including education."'' 66 The crucial kind of
stability that Dworkin maintains is needed here is that of integrity: "the
system of rights must be interpreted, so far as possible, as expressing a
coherent vision of justice." 167 Historicism, particularly in it strongest
form, "is tantamount to denying that the Constitution expresses princi-
ples, for principles cannot be seen as stopping where some historical
statesman's time, imagination, and interest stopped. The Constitution
takes rights seriously; historicism does not."16s
As a Justice of the Supreme Court embued with this vision, Hercu-
les adopts neither passivism nor activism, the latter of which Dworkin
considers another version of the discredited position of pragmatism.
Rather, Hercules considers the requirements of justice, of fairness, and of
majority rule. While fairness demands deference to stable and abstract
features of national life, it does not demand deference to the views of "a
local or transient political majority just because these have triumphed on
a particular political occasion." '1 69 The Constitution as the foundation of
law must be foundational as a whole. Because "[i]t must fit and justify
the most basic arrangements of political power[,] ... it must be a justifi-
cation drawn from the most philosophical reaches of political theory.
Lawyers are always philosophers, because jurisprudence is part of any
lawyer's account of what the law is."170
With this background behind him, Dworkin finally turns to examine
the theoretical issues raised by Brown v. Board of Education: what are
the "character" and the "dimensions" of the right not to be discrimi-
nated against?171 Dworkin is vitally interested in the question because he
wishes to determine how, if at all, the principles underlying Brown apply
to the problem of affirmative action. Dworkin examines three possible
groundings for that right. The first adopts the method of suspect classifi-
cations and "supposes... that people have no distinct right not to be the
victim of racial or other discrimination beyond what the rationality re-
straint already requires."I'7 It merely insists, according to Dworkin,
that the classifications adopted by the legislature give "equal effect to all
the preferences displayed in the community."'7 3 The second theory "in-
166. Id. at 368.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 369.
169. Id. at 376. See also id. at 369-79 (arguing for rejection of passivism as a possible judicial
strategy).
170. Id. at 380.
171. Id. at 382.
172. Id. at 383.
173. Id. at 385.
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sists that the Constitution does recognize a distinct right against discrim-
ination as a trump over any state's conception of the general interest. 1 1 4
The third is more subtle. Unlike most conceptions of equality, it does
not "make the public interest, and therefore public policy, sensitive to
people's tastes, preferences, and choices."17 5 The third theory instead
requires
that people have a right, against this type of collective justification,
that certain sources or types of preferences or choices not be allowed to
count in that way. It insists that preferences that are rooted in some
sort of prejudice against one group can never count in favor of a policy
that includes the disadvantage of that group 1,76
The first theory, which relies on suspect classifications, might or
might not condemn racially segregated schools. It would depend upon
the factual circumstances. Hercules will therefore reject it.177 Even in
1954 it did not reflect people's convictions about racial justice. The sec-
ond theory, which relies on "banned categories," would condemn all ra-
cially segregated education. Hercules would respond more favorably to
it. Hercules would also respond favorably to the third theory, which ad-
mittedly would also be more difficult to apply in the adjudication of
cases. It would require the construction of "a practical elaboration based
on judgments about the kinds of preferences that often or typically have
been generated through prejudice, and about the kinds of political deci-
sions that in normal circumstances could not be justified were such pref-
erences not counted as part of the justification." 178 Difficult as this task
may be, Hercules chooses the third theory because it gives a better an-
swer when he confronts "legislation whose purpose and effect is to benefit
people who have historically been the victims of prejudice." 179 The third
theory, the "banned sources" theory, distinguishes between affirmative
action and Jim Crow. The "banned categories" theory treats them both
in the same way. Dworkin here, of course, is restating in more abstract
form his previous contentions that the affirmative action programs in-
volved in Bakke1 80 and DeFunis181 were constitutionally valid. 182
174. Id at 383-84.
175. Id at 384.
176. Id
177. See id at 385.
178. Id at 386.
179. Id
180. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
181. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
182. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 4, at 293-315 (commenting on Bakke); Dworkin, Reverse
Discrimination, in R. DWORxiN, supra note 3, at 223-39 (commenting on DeFunis). All these essays
first appeared in the New York Review of Books. Dworkin specifically discusses Bakke in Law's
Empire- See R. DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 393-97.
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Dworkin ends on a high rhetorical note. To the old shibboleth that
"law works its way pure," Dworkin responds:
The actual present law, for Hercules, consists in the principle that pro-
vides the best justification available for the doctrines and devices of the
law... (O]nce Hercules has worked out what the law now is, there can
be no purer law latent within it. Law as integrity (we might say) is the
idea of law worked pure.183
We accept integrity as an ideal "because we want to treat ourselves as an
association of principle, as a community governed by a single and coher-
ent vision of justice and fairness and procedural due process in the right
relation." 184 For Hercules, justice alone-that is, "coherence in the sub-
stantive principles of justice--is insufficient to achieve integrity. In-
stead, he seeks "a wider integrity that gives effect to principles of fairness
and procedural due process as well." 185
VII.
I have spent so much time setting out the argument in Law's Empire
because it is a complex book. Confronted with such a book it is all too
easy for the critic to focus on the big picture. The fact that Dworkin
himself often writes at a very high level of abstraction is additional en-
couragement for the critic to do likewise. In resisting the tendency to
start out from a global perspective, I have striven to present an accurate
description of Dworkin's thesis and how it has evolved from his earlier
work.1 86  I would submit that, when they are presented succinctly,
183. R. DwoRIuN, supra note 2, at 400.
184. a at 404.
185. a
186. 1 have tried to put my concise statement of Dworkin's thesis as much as possible in his own
words because one of the criticisms I have made of Dworkin in the past is that the cases he claimed
established the validity of his approach were clearly misstated and misused by him. See Christie,
The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE ,.J. 649 (responding to Dworkin, The Model of Rules, supra
note 5).
In Law's Empire, Dworkin no longer makes the claims for Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22
N.E. 188 (1889) that he made in The Model ofRules. In Riggs, a grandson murdered his grandfa-
ther and the question was whether the young man could inherit under the old man's will. In The
Model ofRules, Dworkin described the case as being an instance in which there was clear law-the
statutory rules governing wills-that would permit the young man to inherit. Dworkin claimed that
instead of applying that law, the court invoked the principle that no man should profit by his own
wrongdoing in order to change the law. See Dworkin, The Model ofRul; supra note 2, at 29. In
The Model ofPrinciples, I pointed out that this was an inaccurate charcterization of Riggs and the
prior case law. See Christie, supra, at 660-62. The United States Supreme Court had already held
that a beneficiary who murdered the insured could not receive the proceeds of the policy and the
courts had long since held that, the statutory provisions on wills notwithstanding, a will procured by
fraud could be avoided. Dworkin seems to have accepted the validity of my criticism because in
Law's Empire he does not use Riggs (which he refers to as "Elmer's Case") as an illustration of the
use of a principle to change a rule of law but rather as a case in which the court was searching for the
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Dworkin's arguments readily display their weaknesses. Accordingly,
rather than extend this review inordinately I will focus only on a few
major points.
First, I would note the criticism that has been skillfully leveled by
others against Dworkin's earlier work: it is a sophisticated attempt to
justify, on supposedly objective grounds, some highly controversial deci-
sions of the Supreme Court. 87 That Dworkin is driven by a political
agenda seems clear. Nowhere perhaps is this made clearer than on the
issue of affirmative action. Dworkin attempts to lead the Court further
than it has ever thus far been prepared to go. It is a topic that he has
addressed on a number of occasions and to which, as noted above, he
returned in Law's Empire. As I have said on another occasion, "[a]
clever person . . can always 'explain' to a DeFunis or a Bakke that
Sweatt v. Painter really does not control the disposition of his case be-
cause, according to a 'correct' background moral theory, denying admis-
sion to him does not denigrate his right to equal respect as a person
whereas denying Sweatt admission to law school does." 1 8 Dworkin's
argument is that no one has a right to be admitted to law school or to
law in the situation presented. R. DwORKmN, supra note 2, at 15-20, 122-23 (describing the case as
one in which the court was trying to discover legislative intent).
The other case that Dworkin relied upon as an illustration of his thesis was Henningsen v.
Blooafield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), a very complicated case. The issue on
which Dworkin focused was the court's striking down a disclaimer of further liability contained in
the warranty provided by the antomobile manufacturer and the automobile dealer. Dworkin saw
this as a conflict between a rule recognizing the validity of contractual obligatious and a principle
that "courts generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a 'bargain' in which one party
has unjustly taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other." Dworkin, The Model of
Rules, supra note 5, at 24. In The Model of Prnciples, I analyzed Henningsen in great detail and
pointed out that it was grossly inaccurate to characterize the case in such a simple way. Christie,
supra, at 662-67. Dworkin does not even discuss Henningsen in Law's Empire
I avert to these matters now not because I wish to reopen old controversies, so to speak, but
because Dworkin continues to use cases to illustrate his points and describes the cases in a very
abstract and, from a lawyer's point of view, very inaccurate way. Given that Dworkin writes as
much for nonlawyers as he does for lawyers, the use of case citation gives his argument a patina of
validity that, I would submit, is not justified. In the course of the present review, I have not at-
tempted to criticize Dworkin's use of cases except with regard to his somewhat simplified treatment
of McLoughlin v. O'Brian. See infia notes 211-16 and accompanying text. I might point out, how-
ever, the following statement found at the beginning ofLaws Empire: "In 1975 the House of Lords,
the highest court in Britain, laid down rules stipnlating how long a Cabinet officer must wait after
leaving office to publish descriptions of confidential Cabinet meetings." R. DwoRKuN, supra note 2,
at 2. The reference given is "Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape, Ltd. [1975] 3 All EBR 484." Id.
at 417 n.4. I will simply point out that the case was not decided by the House of Lords; it was
instead decided by Lord Chief Justice Widgery in Queen's Bench, a trial courtl Secondly, the case
did not lay down the definitive rules that Dworkin claims it did.
187. See, ag., Letwin, Book Review, THE AM. SpECTATOR, San. 1986, at 33-40 (reviewing R.
DWORIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985)).
188. Christie, Why the First Amendment Should not be Interpreted from the Pathological erpec-
tive: A Response to Professor Blas, 1986 DuKE L.. 683, 692.
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medical school; the only right anyone has is not to be discriminated
against because of prejudice. Denying a person like Bakke admission to
medical school because of an affirmative action program does not reflect
any prejudice against him.189 One wonders how the Bakkes of this world
analyze the situation. Dworkin, of course, now openly admits that he is
pursuing a political agenda because he now asserts that law is a political
activity-but a political activity with morally correct solutions. Dwor-
kin's whole argument, sketched out above, for refusing to accept even
clear and unambiguous expressions of legislative intent when it runs
counter to his political agenda strikes me as pure sophistry.1 90
A second and more important point I wish to make about Law's
Empire is that in the process of reformulating and extending his basic
thesis, Dworkin has abandoned one of the principal claims that cat-
apulted him to the forefront of the contemporary jurisprudential scene:
that legal questions, if properly analyzed, have only one right answer.191
Throughout Law's Empire, Dworkin readily concedes that judges operat-
ing in good faith, even when using Dworkin's methods, will often arrive
at different solutions to legal questions. 192 They will each strive to
achieve what for them is the right answer, but that of course is a different
matter. Anyone who is not prepared to decide cases by a flip of the coin,
and who is not prepared to accept that it is a matter of indifference what
decision he arrives at, will, if he is acting in good faith, strive to arrive at
the best solution he can. Dworkin strives to maintain a semblance of
consistency with his earlier assertions by insisting that it is meaningful to
talk of right answers even when it is contestable what those right answers
are.193 This is an assertion to which the critic can only reply, "So what?"
189. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
190. I do not purport to be a trained literary critic, and I am therefore reluctant to say much
about the validity of Dworkin's methods when applied to literary criticism. To demonstrate my
nalvet6, if, in interpreting a text, the critic endeavors to make it the best literary work he can, why
should he not also make the text the best text that he can? What if there are some (small) gaps in the
text because portions of the manuscript have been destroyed? To change perspectives, what about
someoue faced with the task of restoring an old painting. What is his function? To make the paint-
ing the best he thinks it can be? Or is it to restore it, as nearly as possible, to the painting Valasquez
or Michelangelo or some unknown artist painted? See Profiles; THE NEW YoRKER, Mar. 16, 1987,
at 44. Is all philosophy interpretation of Aristotle? Does not the importance of past work, as my
colleague William Van Alstyne maintains, lie instead in its provocative power, challenging us to do
better in our own work no matter how elegant the text of that older work may be or how subtle and
profound its argument?
191. For expositions of this view, see in particular Dworkin, supra note 8, and Dworkin, supra
note 9. Dworkin insisted in The Model ofRules thatjudges only have discretion in the "weak sense"
of discretion. Dworkin, The Model of Rules; supra note 5, at 39.
192. See eg., IL DwoRyam, supra note 2, at 85-86, 237-39, 250, 256, 334, 413.
193. One can do no better than quote Dworkin's own words when he is discussing whether
external skepticism-particularly external skepticism with regard to moral questions-"is a signifi-
cant theory." Id. at 80. Dworkin does not sec how, even if external skepticism is a sound theory, it
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Or, if the critic is more charitable, "That's interesting." In practice it is
an admission that we shall never be able to agree on what the right an-
swer is. Perhaps Dworkin is merely and belatedly recognizing reality or
perhaps he is striving to convince the critical legal scholarship school-
which he criticizes 94 but nevertheless wishes to continue to engage in
dialogue---"to take Dworkin seriously."
A third point I would like to note is that Law's Empire has greatly
softened the sharp distinction Dworkin used to make between the legisla-
tive role and the judicial role. He now opeuly concedes that the regime
of principle required by the model of law as integrity applies to legisla-
tors as well as judges. 195 The problem that gives Dworkin difficulty is
what he calls the "checkerboard statute," such as a legal regime provid-
ing for strict liability against the makers of automobiles but not of some
other products, such as washing machines.' 96 He is prepared to permit
legislatures to adopt that sort of solution occasionally out of a concern
for 'justice" even at the expense of "integrity" on the ground that half a
loaf is better than none.' 97 To some extent the problem is a self-created
one. Dworkin has a predilection for operating on a plane of generality in
which he can make sweeping declarations of what a commitment to prin-
ciple requires and in which the so-called principles in play can be pithily
described. If he were to examine the problems of, say, accidents involv-
ing automobiles and accidents involving washing machines in detail,
there might be no "checkerboard" problem at all. One type of machine
might be more dangerous, be less likely to be covered by first-party insur-
ance, involve more difficult problems of proof of fault, etc. In short, the
situations might not be all that comparable. Indeed, there might be
nothing unprincipled in a court's constructing the same regime, namely a
regime in which strict liability is imposed upon the makers of some prod-
ucts but not upon the makers of others.1 98
"would in any way condemn the belief interpreters commonly have: that one interpretation of some
text or social practice can be on balance better than others, that there can be a 'right answer' to the
question which is best even when it is controversial what the right answer is." Id. (footnote
omitted).
194. See 1d. at 271-75.
195. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 104-07 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 107.
198. As a historical matter, courts have done precisely that. See, eg., Rogers v. Toni Home
Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1948) (cosmetis); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc.
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942) (food); Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135
P. 633 (1913) (food). Even liability based on negligence distinguished among products. See Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) ("If the nature of a
thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is
then a thing of danger.").
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There are any number of telling criticisms that could be made
against the argument that Dworkin is attempting to sketch out about the
appropriateness or inappropriateness of certain types of distinctions in
judicial reasoning. Is, for example, the distinction between economic loss
and physical injury any more principled than the distinction between
automobiles and washing machines?199 At the level of generality at
which Dworkin pitches his argument, it is pointless to pursue this line of
argument much further. The basic problem goes back to one of Dwor-
kin's original assertions, that it is improper for courts to decide cases on
the ground of policy; courts must only decide cases on the ground of
principle. Over the years, this has been one of the best known features of
Dworkin's writing. People such as Greenawalt 20° have dismissed Dwor-
kin's contention as nonsense; courts do and must rely on policy in decid-
ing difficult cases that involve major social ramifications. Others have
found Dworkin's argument more congenial. Among these seemingly
have been judges sitting in the House of Lords, particularly Lord
Scarman and, perhaps to a lesser extent, Lord Bridge of Harwich in Mc-
Loughlin v. O'Brian.201 In that case, Lord Edmond-Davies found the
suggestion that the policy issue was not justiciable-that liability must
instead turn solely on the principle of foreseeability---"novel" and
"counter to well-established and wholly acceptable law." 202 Lord
Scarman and Lord Bridge of Harwich were particularly concerned with
rejecting the relevance of the "floodgates argument" in establishing the
ambit of the duty of care with regard to emotional injury. The attempt
to make judicial development of the common law responsive ouly to
principle is a hazardous endeavor. Subsequent cases, in which both the
199. The closest Dworkin comes to addressing this issue is when he declares "[Jif [government]
appeals to the principle that people have a right to compensation from those who injure them care-
lessly, as its reason why manufacturers are liable for defective automobiles, it must give full efrect to
that principle in deciding whether accountants are liable for their mistakes as well." R. DwoRKiN,
supra note 2, at 165. He cites Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465
(1963). He does not mention that the liability for negligent misrepresentation recognized inHedley
Byrne was hedged by many restrictions not applicable to automobile manufacturers. See Hedley
Byrne, [1964] A.C. at 491-93. More to the point, in the United States automobile manufacturers are
subject to strict liability in most states for physical injuries caused by defective automobiles. Should
accountants be strictly liable for mistakes? One would have liked to have seen how Dworkin would
approach the whole question of liability for pure economic loss under English law, a subject dis-
oussed in a number of recent decisions, some of the more important of which are cited infra notes
203-06.
200. See Greenawalt, Politcy, Rights and Judicia Deciston, 11 GA. L. REv. 991 (1977); Greena-
wait, Discretton and Judicial Decislon: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judge 75
COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975).
201. [1983] 1 A.C. 410 (1982).
202. Id. at 427. Lord Edmund-Davies was responding to the arguments of Lord Scarman, Id. at
430-31, and Lord Bridge of Harwich. Uda t 431-43. For Lord Bridge of Harwich's rejoinder, see id,
at 443.
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House of Lords and the Privy Council limited the right to recover in tort
for pure economic loss that had seemingly been established by earlier
cases clearly show that the English judiciary is not about to embrace the
foreseeability principle regardless of so-called pragmatic or policy consid-
erations 20 3 In one of these cases, Governor of the Peabody Donation
Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co.,204 Lord Scarman and Lord Bridge
of Harwich concurred in a judgment that sharply limited a local govern-
mental authority's liability to one who had suffered economic loss. The
authority's inspector negligently failed to take any action when he dis-
covered that the contractor was installing a drainage system different
from the one approved by the authority. A prior decision of the House
of Lords directly on point2°5 was distinguished 20 6 on the ground that the
plaintiff owner, an individual who did recover for mere economic loss,
was potentially threatened with physical injury. Because the plaintiff in
Peabody Donation Fund was a charitable foundation, the Lords con-
cluded that there was, of course, no possibility of such injury to the
owner!207
Rather than pursue the question of whether it is or is not appropri-
ate for courts to consider policy in arriving at their decisions, or what
types of policy, if any, it is appropriate for legislatures to consider-ques-
tions upon which the contending factions will never be able to convince
the other-it might be appropriate to ask: What does Dworkin mean by
a principle and what does he mean by a policy? One of the positive quali-
ties about Law's Empire is that, in it, Dworkin presents some concrete
examples of what he means by a principle that go beyond the examples
presented in his earlier work. In one of his first articles on common law
adjudication, Dworkin used as examples of principles such ancient max-
ims of the law as "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud
or to take advantage of his own wrong," 208 "courts will not permit them-
selves to be used as instruments of inequity and injustice," 209 and "courts
generally refuse to lend themselves to the enforcement of a 'bargain' in
which one party has unjustly taken advantage of [another]." 210 It would
be hard for any lawyer to reject any of these maxims, or principles, if you
203. See, eg., Candlewood Navigation Corp. v. Nitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., [1986] 1 A.C. 1, 9-11
(1985); Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v. Parkinson, [1985] 1 A.C. 210 (1984).
204. (1985] 1 A.C. 210 (1984).
205. Arms v. Merton London Borough County, [1978] 1 A.C. 728 (1977).
206. [1985] 1 A.C. at 241-45.
207. This attempted distinction is severely criticized in Todd, The Negligence Liability of Public
Authorfties: Divergence in the Common Law, 102 LAw Q. REv. 370, 385-88 (1986).
208. R. DwoRKni, supra note 3, at 23.
209. Id at 24.
210. Id.
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will, although how these generalities apply to concrete cases is another
matter. In Law's Empire, by contrast, Dworkin is prepared to go beyond
these traditional platitudes in his discussion of what are legal principles
and how they are to be applied. In his discussion of McLoughlin v.
O'Brian, the emotional distress case whose facts are described in some
particularity above,211 Dworkin sets forth six possible interpretations of
the common law that might serve as the basis for the decision of the case:
(1) No one has a moral right to compensation except for physical in-
jury. (2) People have a moral right to compensation for emotional
injury suffered at the scene of an accident against anyone whose care-
lessness caused the accident but have no right to compensation for
emotional injury suffered later. (3) People should recover compensa-
tion for emotional injury when a practice of requiring compensation in
their circumstances would diminish the overall costs of accidents or
otherwise make the community richer in the long run. (4) People have
a moral right to compensation for any injury, emotional or physical,
that is the direct consequence of careless conduct, no matter how un-
likely or unforeseeable it is that that conduct would result in that in-
jury. (5) People have a moral right to compensation for emotional or
physical injury that is the consequence of careless conduct, but only if
that injury was reasonably foreseeable by the person who acted care-
lessly. (6) People have a moral right to compensation for reasonably
foreseeable injury but not in circumstances when recognizing such a
right would impose massive and destructive financial burdens on peo-
ple who have been careless out of proportion to their moral fault.212
Interpretation (1) is clearly inconsistent with the previously decided
cases and must therefore be rejected.213 Interpretation (2) is dismissed
because it does not state a principle of justice at all; it merely establishes
an arbitrary line.214 Dworkin also dismisses interpretation (3) because
under at least one plausible interpretation it can be considered "a naked
appeal to policy," which of course is forbidden under his system.215 The
others all pass initial muster; the only question is, are they plausible in-
terpretations of the precedent cases? Dworkin thinks that interpretations
(5) and (6) are the two most plausible contenders.216 He incidentally is
diffident about choosing between them, demonstrating how far he has
come from his single-right-answer days. For present purposes, the point
that I make is merely this: the difference between these sorts of motivat-
ing considerations, especially number (6), and what most people would
call "policy" frankly escapes me. Is it then pointless to argue about
211. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
212. R. DwoRKiN, supra note 2, at 240-41.
213. See id. at 242.
214. See a
215. See id. at 243.
216. See id. at 245-50.
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whether judges should or should not rely on policy because what is called
a principle as opposed to what is called a policy is largely a verbal ques-
tion? Should not the inquiry focus instead on the content of a proposed
basis of decision and on whether it is an appropriate one for a court to
consider? As Dworkin has worked out his system in practice it is ludi-
crous to make the appropriateness of criteria turn on the labels clever
people affix to them rather than on the soundness of the criteria
themselves.
VIII.
Reading Dworkin's book carefully and attempting to answer his
provocative arguments is a very worthwhile enterprise for anyone seri-
ously interested in jurisprudence. It has always been my submission that,
in the end, Dworkin fails to convince. Law's Empire is a noble attempt
by Dworkin to restate his theory of jurisprudence in a single, coherent
form. Unfortunately, not only does he fail to convince, but, in the pro-
cess of restating and refining his theory, he has compromised many of the
positions that established him as the wonder of contemporary Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
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